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Abstract. In the inference attacks studied in Quantitative Information
Flow (QIF), the adversary typically tries to interfere with the system in
the attempt to increase its leakage of secret information. The defender,
on the other hand, typically tries to decrease leakage by introducing some
controlled noise. This noise introduction can be modeled as a type of pro-
tocol composition, i.e., a probabilistic choice among different protocols,
and its effect on the amount of leakage depends heavily on whether or
not this choice is visible to the adversary. In this work we consider op-
erators for modeling visible and invisible choice in protocol composition,
and we study their algebraic properties. We then formalize the interplay
between defender and adversary in a game-theoretic framework adapted
to the specific issues of QIF, where the payoff is information leakage. We
consider various kinds of leakage games, depending on whether players
act simultaneously or sequentially, and on whether or not the choices of
the defender are visible to the adversary. Finally, we establish a hierar-
chy of these games in terms of their information leakage, and provide
methods for finding optimal strategies (at the points of equilibrium) for
both attacker and defender in the various cases. The full version of this
paper can be found in https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.10042
1 Introduction
A fundamental problem in computer security is the leakage of sensitive informa-
tion due to correlation of secret values with observables—i.e., any information
accessible to the attacker, such as, for instance, the system’s outputs or execu-
tion time. The typical defense consists in reducing this correlation, which can
be done in, essentially, two ways. The first, applicable when the correspondence
secret-observable is deterministic, consists in coarsening the equivalence classes
⋆
This version corresponds to the paper published in the POST 2018 conference pro-
ceedings. We suggest the reader to read instead the full version of this paper, available
at [5], also because in this version there are some minor mistakes, which have been
corrected in the full version.
of secrets that give rise to the same observables. This can be achieved with
post-processing, i.e., sequentially composing the original system with a program
that removes information from observables. For example, a typical attack on en-
crypted web traffic consists on the analysis of the packets’ length, and a typical
defense consists in padding extra bits so to diminish the length variety [29].
The second kind of defense, on which we focus in this work, consists in adding
controlled noise to the observables produced by the system. This can be usually
seen as a composition of different protocols via probabilistic choice.
Example 1 (Differential privacy). Consider a counting query f , namely a func-
tion that, applied to a dataset x, returns the number of individuals in x that
satisfy a given property. A way to implement differential privacy [13] is to add
geometrical noise to the result of f , so to obtain a probability distribution P on
integers of the form P (z) = c e∣z−f(x)∣, where c is a normalization factor. The
resulting mechanism can be interpreted as a probabilistic choice on protocols of
the form f(x), f(x)+1, f(x)+2, . . . , f(x)−1, f(x)−2, . . ., where the probability
assigned to f(x) + n and to f(x) − n decreases exponentially with n.
Example 2 (Dining cryptographers). Consider two agents running the dining
cryptographers protocol [12], which consists in tossing a fair binary coin and
then declaring the exclusive or ⊕ of their secret value x and the result of the
coin. The protocol can be thought as the fair probabilistic choice of two proto-
cols, one consisting simply of declaring x, and the other declaring x⊕ 1.
Most of the work in the literature of quantitative information flow (QIF)
considers passive attacks, in which the adversary only observes the system. No-
table exceptions are the works [9,22,4], which consider attackers who interact
with and influence the system, possibly in an adaptive way, with the purpose of
maximizing the leakage of information.
Example 3 (CRIME attack). Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy (CRIME)
[26] is a security exploit against secret web cookies over connections using the
HTTPS and SPDY protocols and data compression. The idea is that the attacker
can inject some content a in the communication of the secret x from the target
site to the server. The server then compresses and encrypts the data, including
both a and x, and sends back the result. By observing the length of the result,
the attacker can then infer information about x. To mitigate the leakage, one
possible defense would consist in transmitting, along with x, also an encryption
method f selected randomly from a set F . Again, the resulting protocol can be
seen as a composition, using probabilistic choice, of the protocols in the set F .
In all examples above the main use of the probabilistic choice is to obfuscate
the relation between secrets and observables, thus reducing their correlation—
and, hence, the information leakage. To achieve this goal, it is essential that the
attacker never comes to know the result of the choice. In the CRIME exam-
ple, however, if f and a are chosen independently, then (in general) it is still
better to choose f probabilistically, even if the adversary will come to know,
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afterwards, the choice of f . In fact, this is true also for the attacker: his best
strategies (in general) are to chose a according to some probability distribution.
Indeed, suppose that F = {f1, f2} are the defender’s choices and A = {a1, a2}
are the attacker’s, and that f1(⋅, a1) leaks more than f1(⋅, a2), while f2(⋅, a1)
leaks less than f2(⋅, a2). This is a scenario like the matching pennies in game
theory: if one player selects an action deterministically, the other player may
exploit this choice and get an advantage. For each player the optimal strategy
is to play probabilistically, using a distribution that maximizes his own gain for
all possible actions of the adversary. In zero-sum games, in which the gain of
one player coincides with the loss of the other, the optimal pair of distributions
always exists, and it is called saddle point. It also coincides with the Nash equi-
librium, which is defined as the point in which neither of the two players gets
any advantage in changing unilaterally his strategy.
Motivated by these examples, this paper investigates the two kinds of choice,
visible and hidden (to the attacker), in a game-theoretic setting. Looking at
them as language operators, we study their algebraic properties, which will help
reason about their behavior in games. We consider zero-sum games, in which the
gain (for the attacker) is represented by the leakage. While for visible choice it
is appropriate to use the “classic” game-theoretic framework, for hidden choice
we need to adopt the more general framework of the information leakage games
proposed in [4]. This happens because, in contrast with standard game theory,
in games with hidden choice the utility of a mixed strategy is a convex func-
tion of the distribution on the defender’s pure actions, rather than simply the
expected value of their utilities. We will consider both simultaneous games—in
which each player chooses independently—and sequential games— in which one
player chooses his action first. We aim at comparing all these situations, and at
identifying the precise advantage of the hidden choice over the visible one.
To measure leakage we use the well-known information-theoretic model. A
central notion in this model is that of entropy, but here we use its converse, vul-
nerability, which represents the magnitude of the threat. In order to derive results
as general as possible, we adopt the very comprehensive notion of vulnerability
as any convex and continuous function, as used in [9] and [6]. This notion has
been shown [6] to subsume most information measures, including Bayes vulner-
ability (aka min-vulnerability, aka (the converse of) Bayes risk) [28,11], Shannon
entropy [27], guessing entropy [23], and g-vulnerability [7].
The main contributions of this paper are:
– We present a general framework for reasoning about information leakage in
a game-theoretic setting, extending the notion of information leakage games
proposed in [4] to both simultaneous and sequential games, with either hid-
den or visible choice.
– We present a rigorous compositional way, using visible and hidden choice
operators, for representing adversary and defender’s actions in information
leakage games. In particular, we study the algebraic properties of visible and
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hidden choice on channels, and compare the two kinds of choice with respect
to the capability of reducing leakage, in presence of an adaptive attacker.
– We provide a taxonomy of the various scenarios (simultaneous and sequen-
tial) showing when randomization is necessary, for either attacker or de-
fender, to achieve optimality. Although it is well-known in information flow
that the defender’s best strategy is usually randomized, only recently it has
been shown that when defender and adversary act simultaneously, the ad-
versary’s optimal strategy also requires randomization [4].
– We use our framework in a detailed case study of a password-checking pro-
tocol. The naive program, which checks the password bit by bit and stops
when it finds a mismatch, is clearly very insecure, because it reveals at each
attempt the maximum correct prefix. On the other hand, if we continue
checking until the end of the string (time padding), the program becomes
very inefficient. We show that, by using probabilistic choice instead, we can
obtain a good trade-off between security and efficiency.
Plan of the paper. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we review some basic notions of game theory and quantitative information flow.
In Section 3 we introduce our running example. In Section 4 we define the vis-
ible and hidden choice operators and demonstrate their algebraic properties. In
Section 5, the core of the paper, we examine various scenarios for leakage games.
In Section 6 we show an application of our framework to a password checker. In
Section 7 we discuss related work and, finally, in Section 8 we conclude.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we review some basic notions from game theory and quantitative
information flow. We use the following notation: Given a set I, we denote by
DI the set of all probability distributions over I. Given µ ∈ DI, its support
supp(µ) def= {i ∈ I ∶ µ(i) > 0} is the set of its elements with positive probability.
We use i←µ to indicate that a value i∈I is sampled from a distribution µ on I.
2.1 Basic concepts from game theory
Two-player games Two-player games are a model for reasoning about the
behavior of two players. In a game, each player has at its disposal a set of
actions that he can perform, and he obtains some gain or loss depending on the
actions chosen by both players. Gains and losses are defined using a real-valued
payoff function. Each player is assumed to be rational, i.e., his choice is driven by
the attempt to maximize his own expected payoff. We also assume that the set of
possible actions and the payoff functions of both players are common knowledge.
In this paper we only consider finite games, in which the set of actions avail-
able to the players are finite. Next we introduce an important distinction between
simultaneous and sequential games. In the following, we will call the two players
defender and attacker.
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Simultaneous games In a simultaneous game, each player chooses his action
without knowing the action chosen by the other. The term “simultaneous” here
does not mean that the players’ actions are chosen at the same time, but only
that they are chosen independently. Formally, such a game is defined as a tuple
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(D, A, ud, ua), where D is a nonempty set of defender’s actions, A is a nonempty
set of attacker’s actions, ud ∶ D × A → R is the defender’s payoff function, and
ua ∶ D ×A → R is the attacker’s payoff function.
Each player may choose an action deterministically or probabilistically. A
pure strategy of the defender (resp. attacker) is a deterministic choice of an ac-
tion, i.e., an element d ∈ D (resp. a ∈ A). A pair (d, a) is called pure strategy
profile, and ud(d, a), ua(d, a) represent the defender’s and the attacker’s payoffs,
respectively. A mixed strategy of the defender (resp. attacker) is a probabilis-
tic choice of an action, defined as a probability distribution δ ∈ DD (resp.
α ∈ DA). A pair (δ, α) is called mixed strategy profile. The defender’s and
the attacker’s expected payoff functions for mixed strategies are defined, respec-
tively, as: Ud(δ, α) def= Ed←δ
a←α
ud(d, a) = ∑d∈D
a∈A
δ(d)α(a)ud(d, a) and Ua(δ, α) def=
Ed←δ
a←α
ua(d, a) = ∑d∈D
a∈A
δ(d)α(a)ua(d, a).
A defender’s mixed strategy δ ∈ DD is a best response to an attacker’s mixed
strategy α ∈ DA if Ud(δ, α) = maxδ′∈DD Ud(δ′, α). Symmetrically, α ∈ DA is
a best response to δ ∈ DD if Ua(δ, α) = maxα′∈DAUd(δ, α′). A mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium is a profile (δ∗, α∗) such that δ∗ is the best response to α∗
and vice versa. This means that in a Nash equilibrium, no unilateral deviation
by any single player provides better payoff to that player. If δ
∗
and α
∗
are
point distributions concentrated on some d
∗
∈ D and a
∗
∈ A respectively, then(δ∗, α∗) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and will be denoted by (d∗, a∗).
While not all games have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, every finite game
has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Sequential games In a sequential game players may take turns in choosing
their actions. In this paper, we only consider the case in which each player
moves only once, in such a way that one of the players (the leader) chooses his
action first, and commits to it, before the other player (the follower) makes his
choice. The follower may have total knowledge of the choice made by the leader,
or only partial. We refer to the two scenarios by the terms perfect and imperfect
information, respectively.
We now give the precise definitions assuming that the leader is the defender.
The case in which the leader is the attacker is similar.
A defender-first sequential game with perfect information is a tuple (D,
D→A, ud, ua) where D, A, ud and ua are defined as in simultaneous games.
Also the strategies of the defender (the leader) are defined as in simultane-
ous games: an action d ∈ D for the pure case, and a distribution δ ∈ DD for
the mixed one. On the other hand, a pure strategy for the attacker is a func-
tion sa ∶ D→A, which represents the fact that his choice of an action sa in A
5
Following the convention of security games, we set the first player to be the defender.
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depends on the defender’s choice d. An attacker’s mixed strategy is a probabil-
ity distribution σa ∈ D(D→A) over his pure strategies.6 The defender’s and
the attacker’s expected payoff functions for mixed strategies are defined, respec-
tively, as Ud(δ, σa) def= E d←δ
sa←σa
ud(d, sa(d)) = ∑ d∈D
sa∶D→A
δ(d)σa(sa)ud(d, sa(d)) and
Ua(δ, σa) def= E d←δ
sa←σa
ua(d, sa(d)) =∑ d∈D
sa∶D→A
δ(d)σa(sa)ua(d, sa(d)).
The case of imperfect information is typically formalized by assuming an
indistinguishability (equivalence) relation over the actions chosen by the leader,
representing a scenario in which the follower cannot distinguish between the
actions belonging to the same equivalence class. The pure strategies of the fol-
lowers, therefore, are functions from the set of the equivalence classes on the
actions of the leader to his own actions. Formally, a defender-first sequential
game with imperfect information is a tuple (D, Ka → A, ud, ua) where D, A,
ud and ua are defined as in simultaneous games, and Ka is a partition of D. The
expected payoff functions are defined as before, except that now the argument
of sa is the equivalence class of d. Note that in the case in which all defender’s
actions are indistinguishable from each other at the eyes of the attacker (totally
imperfect information), we have Ka = {D} and the expected payoff functions
coincide with those of the simultaneous games.
Zero-sum games and Minimax Theorem A game (D, A, ud, ua) is zero-sum
if for any d ∈ D and any a ∈ A, the defender’s loss is equivalent to the attacker’s
gain, i.e., ud(d, a) = −ua(d, a). For brevity, in zero-sum games we denote by u
the attacker’s payoff function ua, and by U the attacker’s expected payoff Ua.
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Consequently, the goal of the defender is to minimize U , and the goal of the
attacker is to maximize it.
In simultaneous zero-sum games the Nash equilibrium corresponds to the so-
lution of the minimax problem (or equivalently, the maximin problem), namely,
the strategy profile (δ∗, α∗) such that U(δ∗, α∗) = minδmaxα U(δ, α). The von
Neumann’s minimax theorem, in fact, ensures that such solution (which always
exists) is stable.
Theorem 1 (von Neumann’s minimax theorem) Let X ⊂ R
m
and Y ⊂
R
n
be compact convex sets, and U ∶ X × Y → R be a continuous function such
that U (x, y) is a convex function in x ∈ X and a concave function in y ∈ Y.
Then minx∈X maxy∈Y U (x, y) = maxy∈Y minx∈X U (x, y).
6
The definition of the mixed strategies as D(D → A) means that the attacker draws
a function sa ∶ D→A before he knows the choice of the defender. In contrast, the
so-called behavioral strategies are defined as functions D → DA, and formalize the
idea that the draw is made after the attacker knows such choice. In our setting, these
two definitions are equivalent, in the sense that they yield the same payoff.
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Conventionally in game theory the payoff u is set to be that of the first player, but
we prefer to look at the payoff from the point of view of the attacker to be in line
with the definition of payoff as vulnerability.
6
A related property is that, under the conditions of Theorem 1, there exists a
saddle point (x∗, y∗) s.t., for all x∈X and y∈Y: U (x∗, y)≤U (x∗, y∗)≤U (x, y∗).
The solution of the minimax problem can be obtained by using convex op-
timization techniques. In case U (x, y) is affine in x and in y, we can also use
linear optimization.
In case D and A contain two elements each, there is a closed form for the
solution. Let D = {d0, d1} and A = {a0, a1} respectively. Let uij be the utility of
the defender on di, aj . Then the Nash equilibrium (δ∗, α∗) is given by: δ∗(d0) =(u11−u10)/(u00−u01−u10+u11) and α∗(a0) = (u11−u01)/(u00−u01−u10+u11) if these values
are in [0, 1]. Note that, since there are only two elements, the strategy δ∗ is
completely specified by its value in d0, and analogously for α
∗
.
2.2 Quantitative information flow
Finally, we briefly review the standard framework of quantitative information
flow, which is concerned with measuring the amount of information leakage in a
(computational) system.
Secrets and vulnerability A secret is some piece of sensitive information the
defender wants to protect, such as a user’s password, social security number, or
current location. The attacker usually only has some partial knowledge about
the value of a secret, represented as a probability distribution on secrets called
a prior. We denote by X the set of possible secrets, and we typically use pi to
denote a prior belonging to the set DX of probability distributions over X .
The vulnerability of a secret is a measure of the utility that it represents for
the attacker. In this paper we consider a very general notion of vulnerability,
following [6], and we define a vulnerability V to be any continuous and convex
function of type DX → R. It has been shown in [6] that these functions coincide
with the set of g-vulnerabilities, and are, in a precise sense, the most general
information measures w.r.t. a set of basic axioms.
8
Channels, posterior vulnerability, and leakage Computational systems can be
modeled as information theoretic channels. A channel C ∶ X × Y → R is a
function in which X is a set of input values, Y is a set of output values, and
C(x, y) represents the conditional probability of the channel producing output
y ∈ Y when input x ∈ X is provided. Every channel C satisfies 0 ≤ C(x, y) ≤ 1
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, and ∑y∈Y C(x, y) = 1 for all x ∈ X .
A distribution pi ∈ DX and a channel C with inputs X and outputs Y
induce a joint distribution p(x, y) = pi(x)C(x, y) on X × Y, producing joint
random variables X,Y with marginal probabilities p(x) = ∑y p(x, y) and p(y) =
∑x p(x, y), and conditional probabilities p(x∣y) = p(x,y)/p(y) if p(y) ≠ 0. For a
8
More precisely, if posterior vulnerability is defined as the expectation of the vulnera-
bility of posterior distributions, the measure respects the data-processing inequality
and always yields non-negative leakage iff vulnerability is convex.
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given y (s.t. p(y) ≠ 0), the conditional probabilities p(x∣y) for each x ∈ X form
the posterior distribution pX∣y.
A channel C in which X is a set of secret values and Y is a set of observable
values produced by a system can be used to model computations on secrets.
Assuming the attacker has prior knowledge pi about the secret value, knows
how a channel C works, and can observe the channel’s outputs, the effect of the
channel is to update the attacker’s knowledge from pi to a collection of posteriors
pX∣y, each occurring with probability p(y).
Given a vulnerability V, a prior pi, and a channel C, the posterior vulnerability
V [pi,C] is the vulnerability of the secret after the attacker has observed the
output of the channel C. Formally: V [pi,C] def= ∑y∈Y p(y)V [pX∣y].
It is known from the literature [6] that the posterior vulnerability is a convex
function of pi. Namely, for any channel C, any family of distributions {pii}, and
any set of convex coefficients {ci}, we have: V [∑i cipii, C] ≤ ∑i ciV [pii, C].
The (information) leakage of channel C under prior pi is a comparison be-
tween the vulnerability of the secret before the system was run—called prior
vulnerability—and the posterior vulnerability of the secret. Leakage reflects by
how much the observation of the system’s outputs increases the attacker’s infor-
mation about the secret. It can be defined either additively (V [pi,C] − V [pi]),
or multiplicatively (V[pi,C]/V[pi]).
3 An illustrative example
Program 0
High Input: x ∈ {0, 1}
Low Input: a ∈ {0, 1}
Output: y ∈ {0, 1}
y = x ⋅ a
return y
Program 1
High Input: x ∈ {0, 1}
Low Input: a ∈ {0, 1}
Output: y ∈ {0, 1}
c ← flip coin with bias a/3
if c = heads {y = x}
else {y = x¯}
return y
Fig. 1. Running example.
We introduce an example which will serve as run-
ning example through the paper. Although admit-
tedly contrived, this example is simple and yet pro-
duces different leakage measures for all different com-
binations of visible/invisible choice and simultane-
ous/sequential games, thus providing a way to com-
pare all different scenarios we are interested in.
Consider that a binary secret must be processed
by a program. As usual, a defender wants to protect
the secret value, whereas an attacker wants to infer
it by observing the system’s output. Assume the de-
fender can choose which among two alternative ver-
sions of the program to run. Both programs take the
secret value x as high input, and a binary low input
a whose value is chosen by the attacker. They both
return the output in a low variable y.
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Program 0
returns the binary product of x and a, whereas Program 1 flips a coin with bias
a/3 (i.e., a coin which returns heads with probability a/3) and returns x if the
result is heads, and the complement x¯ of x otherwise. The two programs are
represented in Figure 1.
9
We adopt the usual convention in QIF of referring to secret variables, inputs and
outputs in programs as high, and to their observable counterparts as low.
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The combined choices of the defender’s and of the attacker’s determine how
the system behaves. Let D={0, 1} represent the set of the defender’s choices—
i.e., the index of the program to use—, and A = {0, 1} represent the set of
the attacker’s choices—i.e., the value of the low input a. We shall refer to the
elements of D and A as actions. For each possible combination of actions d ∈ D
and a ∈ A, we can construct a channel Cda modeling how the resulting system
behaves. Each channel Cda is a function of type X × Y → R, where X = {0, 1}
is the set of possible high input values for the system, and Y = {0, 1} is the set
of possible output values from the system. Intuitively, each channel provides the
probability that the system (which was fixed by the defender) produces output
y ∈ Y given that the high input is x ∈ X (and that the low input was fixed by
the attacker). The four possible channels are depicted as matrices below.
C00 y = 0 y = 1
x = 0 1 0
x = 1 1 0
C01 y = 0 y = 1
x = 0 1 0
x = 1 0 1
C10 y = 0 y = 1
x = 0 0 1
x = 1 1 0
C11 y = 0 y = 1
x = 0 1/3 2/3
x = 1 2/3 1/3
Note that channel C00 does not leak any information about the input x (i.e., it
is non-interferent), whereas channels C01 and C10 completely reveal x. Channel
C11 is an intermediate case: it leaks some information about x, but not all.
We want to investigate how the defender’s and the attacker’s choices influence
the leakage of the system. For that we can just consider the (simpler) notion of
posterior vulnerability, since in order to make the comparison fair we need to
assume that the prior is always the same in the various scenarios, and this
implies that the leakage is in a one-to-one correspondence with the posterior
vulnerability (this happens for both additive and multiplicative leakage).
V a = 0 a = 1
d = 0 1/2 1
d = 1 1 2/3
Table 1. Vulnerability of each chan-
nel Cda in the running example.
For this example, assume we are inter-
ested in Bayes vulnerability [11,28], defined
as V(pi) = maxx pi(x) for every pi ∈ DX .
Assume for simplicity that the prior is the
uniform prior piu. In this case we know from
[10] that the posterior Bayes vulnerability of
a channel is the sum of the greatest elements
of each column, divided by the total number of inputs. Table 1 provides the Bayes
vulnerability Vda
def
= V [piu, Cda] of each channel considered above.
Naturally, the attacker aims at maximizing the vulnerability of the system,
while the defender tries to minimize it. The resulting vulnerability will depend
on various factors, in particular on whether the two players make their choice
simultaneously (i.e. without knowing the choice of the opponent) or sequentially.
Clearly, if the choice of a player who moves first is known by an opponent who
moves second, the opponent will be in advantage. In the above example, for
instance, if the defender knows the choice a of the attacker, the most convenient
choice for him is to set d = a, and the vulnerability will be at most 2/3 . Vice
versa, if the attacker knows the choice d of the defender, the most convenient
choice for him is to set a ≠ d. The vulnerability in this case will be 1.
Things become more complicated when players make choices simultaneously.
None of the pure choices of d and a are the best for the corresponding player,
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because the vulnerability of the system depends also on the (unknown) choice
of the other player. Yet there is a strategy leading to the best possible situation
for both players (the Nash equilibrium), but it is mixed (i.e., probabilistic), in
that the players randomize their choices according to some precise distribution.
Another factor that affects vulnerability is whether or not the defender’s
choice is known to the attacker at the moment in which he observes the output
of the channel. Obviously, this corresponds to whether or not the attacker knows
what channel he is observing. Both cases are plausible: naturally the defender
has all the interest in keeping his choice (and, hence, the channel used) secret,
since then the attack will be less effective (i.e., leakage will be smaller). On the
other hand, the attacker may be able to identify the channel used anyway, for
instance because the two programs have different running times. We will call
these two cases hidden and visible choice, respectively.
It is possible to model players’ strategies, as well as hidden and visible choices,
as operations on channels. This means that we can look at the whole system as
if it were a single channel, which will turn out to be useful for some proofs of our
technical results. Next section is dedicated to the definition of these operators.
We will calculate the exact values for our example in Section 5.
4 Visible and hidden choice operators on channels
In this section we define matrices and some basic operations on them. Since
channels are a particular kind of matrix, we use these matrix operations to
define the operations of visible and hidden choice among channels, and to prove
important properties of these channel operations.
4.1 Matrices, and their basic operators
Given two sets X and Y, a matrix is a total function of type X × Y → R.
Two matrices M1 ∶ X1 × Y1 → R and M2 ∶ X2 × Y2 → R are said to be
compatible if X1 = X2. If it is also the case that Y1 = Y2, we say that the
matrices have the same type. The scalar multiplication r⋅M between a scalar r
and a matrix M is defined as usual, and so is the summation (∑i∈I Mi) (x, y) =
Mi1(x, y)+ . . .+Min(x, y) of a family {Mi}i∈I of matrices all of a same type.
Given a family {Mi}i∈I of compatible matrices s.t. eachMi has type X×Yi →
R, their concatenation ◇i∈I is the matrix having all columns of every matrix in
the family, in such a way that every column is tagged with the matrix it came
from. Formally, (◇i∈IMi) (x, (y, j)) = Mj(x, y), if y ∈ Yj , and the resulting
matrix has type X × (⨆i∈I Yi) → R. 10 When the family {Mi} has only two
elements we may use the binary version ⋄ of the concatenation operator. The
10 ⨆
i∈I
Yi = Yi1 ⊔ Yi2 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Yin denotes the disjoint union {(y, i) ∣ y ∈ Yi, i ∈ I} of
the sets Yi1 , Yi2 , . . ., Yin .
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following depicts the concatenation of two matrices M1 and M2 in tabular form.
M1 y1 y2
x1 1 2
x2 3 4
⋄
M2 y1 y2 y3
x1 5 6 7
x2 8 9 10
=
M1 ⋄M2 (y1, 1) (y2, 1) (y1, 2) (y2, 2) (y3, 2)
x1 1 2 5 6 7
x2 3 4 8 9 10
4.2 Channels, and their hidden and visible choice operators
A channel is a stochastic matrix, i.e., all elements are non-negative, and all rows
sum up to 1. Here we will define two operators specific for channels. In the
following, for any real value 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, we denote by p¯ the value 1 − p.
Hidden choice The first operator models a hidden probabilistic choice among
channels. Consider a family {Ci}i∈I of channels of a same type. Let µ ∈ DI be
a probability distribution on the elements of the index set I. Consider an input
x is fed to one of the channels in {Ci}i∈I , where the channel is randomly picked
according to µ. More precisely, an index i ∈ I is sampled with probability µ(i),
then the input x is fed to channel Ci, and the output y produced by the channel
is then made visible, but not the index i of the channel that was used. Note that
we consider hidden choice only among channels of a same type: if the sets of
outputs were not identical, the produced output might implicitly reveal which
channel was used.
Formally, given a family {Ci}i∈I of channels s.t. each Ci has same type X ×
Y → R, the hidden choice operator ⨊i←µ is defined as ⨊i←µCi = ∑i∈I µ(i)Ci.
Proposition 2 Given a family {Ci}i∈I of channels of type X × Y → R, and a
distribution µ on I, the hidden choice ⨊i←µCi is a channel of type X ×Y → R.
In the particular case in which the family {Ci} has only two elements Ci1
and Ci2 , the distribution µ on indexes is completely determined by a real value
0 ≤ p ≤ 1 s.t. µ(i1) = p and µ(i2) = p¯. In this case we may use the binary version
p⊕ of the hidden choice operator:Ci1 p⊕ Ci2 = pCi1+p¯ Ci2 . The example below
depicts the hidden choice between channels C1 and C2, with probability p=1/3.
C1 y1 y2
x1 1/2 1/2
x2 1/3 2/3 1/3⊕
C2 y1 y2
x1 1/3 2/3
x2 1/2 1/2 =
C1 1/3⊕ C2 y1 y2
x1 7/18 11/18
x2 4/9 5/9
Visible choice The second operator models a visible probabilistic choice among
channels. Consider a family {Ci}i∈I of compatible channels. Let µ ∈ DI be a
probability distribution on the elements of the index set I. Consider an input x
is fed to one of the channels in {Ci}i∈I , where the channel is randomly picked
according to µ. More precisely, an index i ∈ I is sampled with probability µ(i),
then the input x is fed to channel Ci, and the output y produced by the channel
is then made visible, along with the index i of the channel that was used. Note
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that visible choice makes sense only between compatible channels, but it is not
required that the output set of each channel be the same.
Formally, given {Ci}i∈I of compatible channels s.t. each Ci has type X×Yi →
R, and a distribution µ on I, the visible choice operator &i←µ is defined as
&i←µCi = ◇i∈I µ(i)Ci.
Proposition 3 Given a family {Ci}i∈I of compatible channels s.t. each Ci has
type X × Yi → R, and a distribution µ on I, the result of the visible choice
&i←µCi is a channel of type X × (⨆i∈I Yi) → R.
In the particular case the family {Ci} has only two elements Ci1 and Ci2 ,
the distribution µ on indexes is completely determined by a real value 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
s.t. µ(i1) = p and µ(i2) = p¯. In this case we may use the binary version pH of
the visible choice operator: Ci1 pH Ci2 = pCi1 ⋄ p¯ Ci2 . The following depicts the
visible choice betwee channels C1 and C3, with probability p=1/3.
C1 y1 y2
x1 1/2 1/2
x2 1/3 2/3 1/3H
C3 y1 y3
x1 1/3 2/3
x2 1/2 1/2 =
C1 1/3H C3 (y1, 1) (y2, 1) (y1, 3) (y3, 3)
x1 1/6 1/6 2/9 4/9
x2 1/9 2/9 1/3 1/3
4.3 Properties of hidden and visible choice operators
We now prove algebraic properties of channel operators. These properties will be
useful when we model a (more complex) protocol as the composition of smaller
channels via hidden or visible choice.
Whereas the properties of hidden choice hold generally with equality, those
of visible choice are subtler. For instance, visible choice is not idempotent, since
in general C pH C ≠ C. (In fact if C has type X × Y → R, C pH C has type
X × (Y ⊔Y) → R.) However, idempotency and other properties involving visible
choice hold if we replace the notion of equality with the more relaxed notion of
“equivalence” between channels. Intuitively, two channels are equivalent if they
have the same input space and yield the same value of vulnerability for every
prior and every vulnerability function.
Definition 4 (Equivalence of channels) Two compatible channels C1 and
C2 with domain X are equivalent, denoted by C1 ≈ C2, if for every prior pi ∈ DX
and every posterior vulnerability V we have V [pi,C1] = V [pi,C2].
Two equivalent channels are indistinguishable from the point of view of infor-
mation leakage, and in most cases we can just identify them. Indeed, nowadays
there is a tendency to use abstract channels [24,6], which capture exactly the
important behavior with respect to any form of leakage. In this paper, however,
we cannot use abstract channels because the hidden choice operator needs a
concrete representation in order to be defined unambiguously.
The first properties we prove regard idempotency of operators, which can be
used do simplify the representation of some protocols.
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Proposition 5 (Idempotency) Given a family {Ci}i∈I of channels s.t. Ci =
C for all i ∈ I, and a distribution µ on I, then: (a) ⨊i←µCi = C; and (b)
&i←µCi ≈ C.
The following properties regard the reorganization of operators, and they
will be essential in some technical results in which we invert the order in which
hidden and visible choice are applied in a protocol.
Proposition 6 (“Reorganization of operators”) Given a family {Cij}i∈I,j∈J
of channels indexed by sets I and J , a distribution µ on I, and a distribution
η on J :
(a) ⨊i←µ ⨊j←ηCij = ⨊i←µ
j←η
Cij , if all Ci’s have the same type;
(b) &i←µ &j←ηCij ≈ &i←µ
j←η
Cij , if all Ci’s are compatible; and
(c) ⨊i←µ &j←ηCij ≈ &j←η ⨊i←µCij , if, for each i, all Cij’s have same type
X×Yj→R.
4.4 Properties of vulnerability w.r.t. channel operators
We now derive some relevant properties of vulnerability w.r.t. our channel op-
erators, which will be later used to obtain the Nash equilibria in information
leakage games with different choice operations.
The first result states that posterior vulnerability is convex w.r.t. hidden
choice (this result was already presented in [4]), and linear w.r.t. to visible choice.
Theorem 7 Let {Ci}i∈I be a family of channels, and µ be a distribution on I.
Then, for every distribution pi on X , and every vulnerability V:
(a) posterior vulnerability is convex w.r.t. to hidden choice: V [pi,⨊i←µCi] ≤
∑i∈I µ(i)V [pi,Ci] if all Ci’s have the same type.
(b) posterior vulnerability is linear w.r.t. to visible choice: V [pi,&i←µCi] =
∑i∈I µ(i)V [pi,Ci] if all Ci’s are compatible.
The next result is concerned with posterior vulnerability under the compo-
sition of channels using both operators.
Corollary 8 Let {Cij}i∈I,j∈J be a family of channels, all with domain X and
with the same type, and let pi ∈ DX , and V be any vulnerability. Define U ∶
DI × DJ → R as follows: U (µ, η) def= V [pi,⨊i←µ &j←η Cij]. Then U is convex
on µ and linear on η.
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5 Information leakage games
In this section we present our framework for reasoning about information leakage,
extending the notion of information leakage games proposed in [4] from only
simultaneous games with hidden choice to both simultaneous and sequential
games, with either hidden or visible choice.
In an information leakage game the defender tries to minimize the leakage of
information from the system, while the attacker tries to maximize it. In this basic
scenario, their goals are just opposite (zero-sum). Both of them can influence the
execution and the observable behavior of the system via a specific set of actions.
We assume players to be rational (i.e., they are able to figure out what is the
best strategy to maximize their expected payoff), and that the set of actions and
the payoff function are common knowledge.
Players choose their own strategy, which in general may be mixed (i.e. prob-
abilistic), and choose their action by a random draw according to that strategy.
After both players have performed their actions, the system runs and produces
some output value which is visible to the attacker and may leak some informa-
tion about the secret. The amount of leakage constitutes the attacker’s gain, and
the defender’s loss.
To quantify the leakage we model the system as an information-theoretic
channel (cf. Section 2.2). We recall that leakage is defined as the difference
(additive leakage) or the ratio (multiplicative leakage) between posterior and
prior vulnerability. Since we are only interested in comparing the leakage of
different channels for a given prior, we will define the payoff just as the posterior
vulnerability, as the value of prior vulnerability will be the same for every channel.
5.1 Defining information leakage games
An (information) leakage game consists of: (1) two nonempty sets D, A of de-
fender’s and attacker’s actions respectively, (2) a function C ∶ D×A → (X×Y →
R) that associates to each pair of actions (d, a) ∈ D×A a channel Cda ∶ X×Y →
R, (3) a prior pi ∈ DX on secrets, and (4) a vulnerability measure V. The payoff
function u ∶ D×A → R for pure strategies is defined as u(d, a) def= V [pi,Cda].
We have only one payoff function because the game is zero-sum.
Like in traditional game theory, the order of actions and the extent by which
a player knows the move performed by the opponent play a critical role in de-
ciding strategies and determining the payoff. In security, however, knowledge of
the opponent’s move affects the game in yet another way: the effectiveness of the
attack, i.e., the amount of leakage, depends crucially on whether or not the at-
tacker knows what channel is being used. It is therefore convenient to distinguish
two phases in the leakage game:
Phase 1: Each player determines the most convenient strategy (which in gen-
eral is mixed) for himself, and draws his action accordingly. One of the
players may commit first to his action, and his choice may or may not be
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revealed to the follower. In general, knowledge of the leader’s action may
help the follower choose a more advantageous strategy.
Phase 2: The attacker observes the output of the selected channel Cda and
performs his attack on the secret. In case he knows the defender’s action,
he is able to determine the exact channel Cda being used (since, of course,
the attacker knows his own action), and his payoff will be the posterior vul-
nerability V [pi,Cda]. However, if the attacker does not know exactly which
channel has been used, then his payoff will be smaller.
Note that the issues raised in Phase 2 are typical of leakage games; they do
not have a correspondence (to the best of our knowledge) in traditional game
theory. On the other hand, these issues are central to security, as they reflect
the principle of preventing the attacker from inferring the secret by obfuscating
the link between secret and observables.
Following the above discussion, we consider various possible scenarios for
games, along two lines of classification. First, there are three possible orders for
the two players’ actions.
Simultaneous: The players choose (draw) their actions in parallel, each with-
out knowing the choice of the other.
Sequential, defender-first: The defender draws an action, and commits to it,
before the attacker does.
Sequential, attacker-first: The attacker draws an action, and commits to it,
before the defender does.
Note that these sequential games may present imperfect information (i.e., the
follower may not know the leader’s action).
Second, the visibility of the defender’s action during the attack may vary:
Visible choice: The attacker knows the defender’s action when he observes the
output of the channel, and therefore he knows which channel is being used.
Visible choice is modeled by the operator &.
Hidden choice: The attacker does not know the defender’s action when he
observes the output of the channel, and therefore in general he does not
exactly know which channel is used (although in some special cases he may
infer it from the output). Hidden choice is modeled by the operator ⨊.
Note that the distinction between sequential and simultaneous games is or-
thogonal to that between visible and hidden choice. Sequential and simultaneous
games model whether or not, respectively, the follower’s choice can be affected
by knowledge of the leader’s action. This dichotomy captures how knowledge
about the other player’s actions can help a player choose his own action. On the
other hand, visible and hidden choice capture whether or not, respectively, the
attacker is able to fully determine the channel representing the system, once de-
fender and attacker’s actions have already been fixed. This dichotomy reflects the
different amounts of information leaked by the system as viewed by the adver-
sary. For instance, in a simultaneous game neither player can choose his action
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Order of action
simultaneous defender 1
st
attacker 1
st
Defender’s
choice
visible & Game I Game II Game III
hidden ⨊ Game IV Game V Game VI
Table 2. Kinds of games we consider. All sequential games have perfect information,
except for game V.
based on the choice of the other. However, depending on whether or not the
defender’s choice is visible, the adversary will or will not, respectively, be able
to completely recover the channel used, which will affect the amount of leakage.
If we consider also the subdivision of sequential games into perfect and im-
perfect information, there are 10 possible different combinations. Some, however,
make little sense. For instance, defender-first sequential game with perfect in-
formation (by the attacker) does not combine naturally with hidden choice ⨊,
since that would mean that the attacker knows the action of the defender and
choses his strategy accordingly, but forgets it at the moment of the attack. (We
assume perfect recall, i.e., the players never forget what they have learned.) Yet
other combinations are not interesting, such as the attacker-first sequential game
with (totally) imperfect information (by the defender), since it coincides with
the simultaneous-game case. Note that attacker and defender are not symmetric
with respect to hiding/revealing their actions a and d, since the knowledge of a
affects the game only in the usual sense of game theory, while the knowledge of
d also affects the computation of the payoff (cf. “Phase 2” above).
Table 2 lists the meaningful and interesting combinations. In Game V we
assume imperfect information: the attacker does not know the action chosen
by the defender. In all the other sequential games we assume that the follower
has perfect information. In the remaining of this section, we discuss each game
individually, using the example of Section 3 as running example.
Game I (simultaneous with visible choice) This simultaneous game can
be represented by a tuple (D, A, u). As in all games with visible choice &,
the expected payoff U of a mixed strategy profile (δ, α) is defined to be the
expected value of u, as in traditional game theory: U (δ, α) def= Ed←δ
a←α
u(d, a) =
∑d∈D
a∈A
δ(d)α(a) u(d, a), where we recall that u(d, a) = V [pi,Cda].
From Theorem 7(b) we derive: U (δ, α) = V [pi,&d←δ
a←α
Cda]. hence the whole
system can be equivalently regarded as the channel &d←δ
a←α
Cda. Still from The-
orem 7(b) we can derive that U (δ, α) is linear in δ and α. Therefore the Nash
equilibrium can be computed using the minimax method (cf. Section 2.1).
Example 9 Consider the example of Section 3 in the setting of Game I. The
Nash equilibrium (δ∗, α∗) can be obtained using the closed formula from Section
2.1, and it is given by δ
∗(0) = α∗(0) = (2/3−1)/(1/2−1−1+2/3) = 2/5. The correspond-
ing payoff is U (δ∗, α∗) = 2/5 2/5 1/2 + 2/5 3/5+ 3/5 2/5 + 3/5 3/5 2/3 = 4/5.
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Game II (defender 1
st
with visible choice) This defender-first sequential
game can be represented by a tuple (D, D→A, u). A mixed strategy profile is
of the form (δ, σa), with δ ∈ DD and σa ∈ D(D→A), and the corresponding
payoff is U (δ, σa) def= E d←δ
sa←σa
u(d, sa(d)) = ∑ d∈D
sa∶D→A
δ(d)σa(sa) u(d, sa(d)), where
u(d, sa(d)) = V [pi,Cdsa(d)].
Again, from Theorem 7(b) we derive: U (δ, σa) = V [pi,& d←δ
sa←σa
Cdsa(d)] and
hence the system can be expressed as channel & d←δ
sa←σa
Cdsa(d). From the same
Theorem we also derive that U (δ, σa) is linear in δ and σa, so the mutually
optimal strategies can be obtained again by solving the minimax problem. In
this case, however, the solution is particularly simple, because it is known that
there are optimal strategies which are deterministic. Hence it is sufficient for the
defender to find the action d which minimizes maxa u(d, a).
Example 10 Consider the example of Section 3 in the setting of Game II. If
the defender chooses 0 then the attacker chooses 1. If the defender chooses 1 then
the attacker chooses 0. In both cases, the payoff is 1. The game has therefore two
solutions, (0, 1) and (1, 0).
Game III (attacker 1
st
with visible choice) This game is also a sequential
game, but with the attacker as the leader. Therefore it can be represented as tuple
of the form (A→D, A, u). It is the same as Game II, except that the roles of the
attacker and the defender are inverted. In particular, the payoff of a mixed strat-
egy profile (σd, α) ∈ D(A→D)×DA is given by U (σd, α) def= Esd←σda←α u(sd(a), a) =
∑sd∶A→D
a∈A
σd(sd)α(a) u(sd(a), a) = V [pi,&sd←σd
a←α
Csd(a)a], and the whole system
can be equivalently regarded as channel &sd←σd
a←α
Csd(a)a. Obviously, also in this
case the minimax problem has a deterministic solution.
In summary, in the sequential case, whether the leader is the defender or the
attacker (Games II and III, respectively), the minimax problem has always a
deterministic solution [25].
Theorem 11 In a defender-first sequential game with visible choice, there exist
d ∈ D and a ∈ A such that, for every δ ∈ DD and σa ∈ D(D→A) we have:
U (d, σa) ≤ u(d, a) ≤ U (δ, a). Similarly, in an attacker-first sequential game with
visible choice, there exist d ∈ D and a ∈ A such that, for every σd ∈ D(A→D)
and α ∈ DA we have: U (d, α) ≤ u(d, a) ≤ U (σd, a).
Example 12 Consider now the example of Section 3 in the setting of Game III.
If the attacker chooses 0 then the defender chooses 0 and the payoff is 1/2. If the
attacker chooses 1 then the defender chooses 1 and the payoff is 2/3. The latter
case is more convenient for the attacker, hence the solution of the game is the
strategy profile (1, 1).
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Game IV (simultaneous with hidden choice) This game is a tuple (D,A, u).
However, it is not an ordinary game in the sense that the payoff a mixed strategy
profile cannot be defined by averaging the payoff of the corresponding pure strate-
gies. More precisely, the payoff of a mixed profile is defined by averaging on the
strategy of the attacker, but not on that of the defender. In fact, when hidden
choice is used, there is an additional level of uncertainty in the relation between
the observables and the secret from the point of view of the attacker, since he
is not sure about which channel is producing those observables. A mixed strat-
egy δ for the defender produces a convex combination of channels (the channels
associated to the pure strategies) with the same coefficients, and we know from
previous sections that the vulnerability is a convex function of the channel, and
in general is not linear.
In order to define the payoff of a mixed strategy profile (δ, α), we need there-
fore to consider the channel that the attacker perceives given his limited knowl-
edge. Let us assume that the action that the attacker draws from α is a. He
does not know the action of the defender, but we can assume that he knows his
strategy (each player can derive the optimal strategy of the opponent, under the
assumption of common knowledge and rational players).
The channel the attacker will see is ⨊d←δCda, obtaining a corresponding
payoff of V [pi,⨊d←δCda]. By averaging on the strategy of the attacker we ob-
tain U (δ, α) def= Ea←αV [pi,⨊d←δCda] = ∑a∈A α(a)V [pi,⨊d←δCda]. From The-
orem 7(b) we derive: U (δ, α) = V [pi,&a←α⨊d←δCda] and hence the whole
system can be equivalently regarded as channel &a←α⨊d←δCda. Note that, by
Proposition 6(c), the order of the operators is interchangeable, and the system
can be equivalently regarded as ⨊d←δ&a←αCda. This shows the robustness of
this model.
From Corollary 8 we derive that U (δ, α) is convex in δ and linear in η, hence
we can compute the Nash equilibrium by the minimax method.
Example 13 Consider now the example of Section 3 in the setting of Game
IV. For δ ∈ DD and α ∈ DA, let p = δ(0) and q = α(0). The system can be
represented by the channel (C00 p⊕ C10) qH (C01 p⊕ C11) represented below.
C00 p⊕ C10 y = 0 y = 1
x = 0 p p¯
x = 1 1 0
qH
C01 p⊕ C11 y = 0 y = 1
x = 0 1/3 + 2/3 p 2/3 − 2/3 p
x = 1 2/3 − 2/3 p 1/3 + 2/3 p
For uniform pi, we have V [pi,C00 p⊕ C10]=1 − 1/2; and V [pi,C10 p⊕ C11] is
equal to 2/3− 2/3 p if p ≤ 1/4, and equal to 1/3+ 2/3 p if p > 1/4. Hence the payoff,
expressed in terms of p and q, is U (p, q) = q(1 − 1/2) + q¯(2/3 − 2/3 p) if p ≤ 1/4,
and U (p, q) = q(1− 1/2)+ q¯(1/3+ 2/3 p) if p > 1/4. The Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗)
is given by p
∗
= argminpmaxq U (p, q) and q∗ = argmaxqminpU (p, q), and by
solving the above, we obtain p
∗
= q
∗
= 4/7.
Game V (defender 1
st
with hidden choice) This is a defender-first sequen-
tial game with imperfect information, hence it can be represented as a tuple of
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the form (D, Ka → A, ud, ua), where Ka is a partition of D. Since we are as-
suming perfect recall, and the attacker does not know anything about the action
chosen by the defender in Phase 2, i.e., at the moment of the attack (except the
probability distribution determined by his strategy), we must assume that the
attacker does not know anything in Phase 1 either. Hence the indistinguisha-
bility relation must be total, i.e., Ka = {D}. But {D} → A is equivalent to A,
hence this kind of game is equivalent to Game IV.
It is also a well known fact in Game theory that when in a sequential game
the follower does not know the leader’s move before making his choice, the game
is equivalent to a simultaneous game.
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Game VI (attacker 1
st
with hidden choice) This game is also a se-
quential game with the attacker as the leader, hence it is a tuple of the form(A→D, A, u). It is similar to Game III, except that the payoff is convex on
the strategy of the defender, instead of linear. The payoff of the mixed strategy
profile (σd, α) ∈ D(A→D) × DA is U (σd, α) def= Ea←αV [pi,⨊sd←σdCsd(a)a] =
V [pi,&a←α ⨊sd←σdCsd(a)a], so the whole system can be equivalently regarded
as channel &a←α ⨊sd←σdCsd(a)a. Also in this case the minimax problem has a
deterministic solution, but only for the attacker.
Theorem 14 In an attacker-first sequential game with hidden choice, there exist
a ∈ A and δ ∈ DD such that, for every α ∈ DA and σd ∈ D(A→D) we have
that U (δ, α) ≤ U (δ, a) ≤ U (σd, a).
Example 15 Consider again the example of Section 3, this time in the setting
of Game VI. Consider also the calculations made in Example 13, we will use
the same results and notation here. In this setting, the attacker is obliged to
make its choice first. If he chooses 0, which corresponds to committing to the
system C00 p⊕ C10, then the defender will choose p = 1/4, which minimizes its
vulnerability. If he chooses 1, which corresponds to committing to the system
C01 p⊕ C11, the defender will choose p = 1, which minimizes its vulnerability
of the above channel. In both cases, the leakage is p = 1/2, hence both these
strategies are solutions to the minimax. Note that in the first case the strategy
of the defender is mixed, while that of the attacker is always pure.
5.2 Comparing the games
If we look at the various payoffs obtained for the running example in the various
games, we obtain the following values (listed in decreasing order): II ∶ 1; I ∶ 4/5;
III ∶ 2/3; IV ∶ 4/7; V ∶ 4/7; VI ∶ 1/2.
11
However, one could argue that, since the defender has already committed, the at-
tacker does not need to perform the action corresponding to the Nash equilibrium,
any payoff-maximizing solution would be equally good for him.
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Fig. 2. Order of games
w.r.t. payoff. Games
higher in the lattice have
larger payoff.
This order is not accidental: for any vulnerability
function, and for any prior, the various games are or-
dered, with respect to the payoff, as shown in Figure 2.
The relations between II, I, and III, and between IV-V
and VI come from the fact that, in any zero-sum se-
quential game the leader’s payoff will be less or equal
to his payoff in the corresponding simultaneous game.
We think this result is well-known in game theory, but
we give the hint of the proof nevertheless, for the sake
of clarity.
Theorem 16 It is the case that:
(a) minδmaxσa V [pi,& d←δ
sa←σa
Cdsa(d)] ≥ minδmaxαV [pi,&d←δ
a←α
Cda]
≥ maxαminσd V [pi,&sd←σda←α Csd(a)a]
(b) minδmaxαV [pi,&a←α⨊d←δCda] ≥ maxαminσd V [pi,⨊a←α &sd←σdCsd(a)a]
Proof. We prove the first inequality in (a). Independently of δ, consider the
attacker strategy τa that assigns probability 1 to the function sa defined as
sa(d) = argmaxa V [pi,Cda]. Then we have that
min
δ
max
σa
V
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
pi, &
d←δ
sa←σa
Cdsa(d)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≥ min
δ
V
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
pi, &
d←δ
sa←τa
Cdsa(d)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≥ min
δ
max
α
V
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
pi, &
d←δ
a←α
Cda
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Note that the strategy τa is optimal for the adversary, so the first of the above
inequalities is actually an equality. All other cases can be proved with an anal-
ogous reasoning. ⊓⊔
Concerning III and IV-V: these are not related. In the running example the
payoff for III is higher than for IV-V, but it is easy to find other cases in which
the situation is reversed. For instance, if in the running example we set C11 to
be the same as C00, the payoff for III will be 1/2, and that for IV-V will be 2/3.
Finally, the relation between III and VI comes from the fact that they are
both attacker-first sequential games, and the only difference is the way in which
the payoff is defined. Then, just observe that in general we have, for every a ∈ A
and every δ ∈ DD: V [pi,⨊d←δCda] ≤ V [pi,&d←δCda].
The relations in Figure 2 can be used by the defender as guidelines to better
protect the system, if he has some control over the rules of the game. Obviously,
for the defender the games lower in the ordering are to be preferred.
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6 Case study: a safer, faster password-checker
Program PWD123
High Input: x ∈ {000, 001, . . . , 111}
Low Input: a ∈ {000, 001, . . . , 111}
Output: y ∈ {T, F }
accept ∶= T
for i = 1, 2, 3 do
if ai ≠ xi then
accept ∶= F
break
end if
end for
return accept
Fig. 3. Password-checker algorithm.
In this section we apply our game-
theoretic, compositional approach to show
how a defender can mitigate an attacker’s
typical timing side-channel attack while
avoiding the usual burden imposed on the
password-checker’s efficiency.
Consider the password-checker PWD123
of Figure 3, which performs a bitwise-check
of a 3-bit low-input a=a1a2a3, provided by
the attacker, against a 3-bit secret pass-
word x=x1x2x3. The low-input is rejected
as soon as it mismatches the secret, and is
accepted otherwise.
The attacker can choose low-inputs to
try to gain information about the password. Obviously, in case PWD123 accepts the
low-input, the attacker learns the password value is a=x. Yet, even when the low-
input is rejected, there is some leakage of information: from the duration of the
execution the attacker can estimate how many iterations have been performed
before the low-input was rejected, thus inferring a prefix of the secret password.
To model this scenario, let X = {000, 001, . . . , 111} be the set of all possible
3-bit passwords, and Y = {(F, 1), (F, 2), (F, 3), (T, 3)} be the set of observables
produced by the system. Each observable is an ordered pair whose first element
indicates whether the password was accepted (T or F ), and the second element
indicates the duration of the computation (1, 2, or 3 iterations). For instance,
channel C123,101 in Figure 4 models PWD123’s behavior when the attacker provides
low-input a=101.
We will adopt as a measure of information Bayes vulnerability [28]. The prior
Bayes vulnerability of a distribution pi∈DX is defined as Vg [pi]=maxx∈X pix,
and represents the probability that the attacker guesses correctly the password
in one try. For instance, if the distribution on all possible 3-bit passwords is
pˆi = (0.0137, 0.0548, 0.2191, 0.4382, 0.0002, 0.0002, 0.0548, 0.2191), its prior Bayes
vulnerability is V [pˆi]=0.4382.
The posterior Bayes vulnerability of a prior pi and a channel C∶X×Y→R is
defined as V [pi,C]=∑y∈Y maxx∈X pixC(x, y), and it represents the probability
that the attacker guesses correctly the password in one try, after he observes
the output of the channel (i.e., after he has measured the time needed for the
checker to accept or reject the low-input). For prior pˆi above, the posterior Bayes
vulnerability of channel C123,101 is V [pˆi, C123,101]=0.6577 (which represents an
increase in Bayes vulnerability of about 50%), and the expected running time
for this checker is of 1.2747 iterations.
A way to mitigate this timing side-channel is to make the checker’s execution
time independent of the secret. Channel Ccons,101 from Figure 4 models a checker
that does that (by eliminating the break command within the loop in PWD123)
when the attacker’s low-input is a=101. This channel’s posterior Bayes vulner-
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ability is V [pˆi, C123,101]=0.4384, which brings the multiplicative Bayes leakage
down to an increase of only about 0.05%. However, the expected running time
goes up to 3 iterations (an increase of about 135% w.r.t. that of C123,101).
C123,101
y= y= y= y=(F,1) (F,2) (F,3) (T,3)
x=000 1 0 0 0
x=001 1 0 0 0
x=010 1 0 0 0
x=011 1 0 0 0
x=100 0 0 1 0
x=101 0 0 0 1
x=110 0 1 0 0
x=111 0 1 0 0
Ccons,101
y= y=(F,3) (T, 3)
x=000 1 0
x=001 1 0
x=010 1 0
x=011 1 0
x=100 1 0
x=101 0 1
x=110 1 0
x=111 1 0
Fig. 4. Channels Cda modeling the password checker
for defender’s action d and attacker’s action a.
Seeking some compro-
mise between security and ef-
ficiency, assume that the de-
fender can employ password-
checkers that perform the
bitwise comparison among
low-input a and secret pass-
word x in different orders.
More precisely, there is one
version of the checker for ev-
ery possible order in which the index i ranges in the control of the loop. For
instance, while PWD123 checks the bits in the order 1, 2, 3, the alternative algo-
rithm PWD231 uses the order 2, 3, 1.
To determine a defender’s best choice of which versions of the checker to run,
we model this problem as game. The attacker’s actions A = {000, 001, . . . , 111}
are all possible low-inputs to the checker, and the defender’s D = {123, 132, 213,
231, 312, 321} are all orders to perform the comparison. Hence, there is a total
of 48 possible channels Cad∶X×Y→R, one for each combination of d∈D, a∈A.
In our framework, the utility of a mixed strategy profile (δ, α) is given by
U (δ, α) = Ea←αV [pi,⨊d←δCda]. For each pure strategy profile (d, a), the payoff
of the game will be the posterior Bayes vulnerability of the resulting channel
Cda (since, if we measuring leakage, the prior vulnerability is the same for every
channel once the prior is fixed). Table 3 depicts such payoffs. Note that the at-
tacker’s and defender’s actions substantially affect the effectiveness of the attack:
vulnerability ranges between 0.4934 and 0.9311 (and so multiplicative leakage
is in the range between an increase of 12% and one of 112%). Using techniques
from [4], we can compute the best (mixed) strategy for the defender in this
game, which turns out to be δ
∗
= (0.1667, 0.1667, 0.1667, 0.1667, 0.1667, 0.1667).
This strategy is part of an equilibrium and guarantees that for any choice of the
attacker the posterior Bayes vulnerability is at most 0.6573 (so the multiplica-
tive leakage is bounded by 50%, an intermediate value between the minimum of
about 12% and the maximum of about 112%). It is interesting to note that the
expected running time, for any action of the attacker, is bounded by at most
Attacker’s action a
U(d,a) 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
D
e
f
e
n
d
e
r
’
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
d
123 0.7257 0.7257 0.9311 0.9311 0.6577 0.6577 0.7122 0.7122
132 0.8900 0.9311 0.8900 0.9311 0.7122 0.7122 0.7122 0.7122
213 0.5068 0.5068 0.9311 0.9311 0.4934 0.4934 0.7668 0.7668
231 0.5068 0.5068 0.7668 0.9311 0.5068 0.5068 0.7668 0.9311
312 0.7257 0.9311 0.7257 0.9311 0.7122 0.8766 0.7122 0.8766
321 0.6712 0.7122 0.7257 0.9311 0.6712 0.7122 0.7257 0.9311
Table 3. Utility for each pure strategy profile.
2.3922 iterations (an
increase of only 87%
w.r.t. the channel
PWD123), which is be-
low the worst possi-
ble expected 3 itera-
tions of the constant-
time password checker.
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7 Related work
Many studies have applied game theory to analyses of security and privacy in
networks [8,15,3], cryptography [16], anonymity [1], location privacy [14], and
intrusion detection [31], to cite a few. See [21] for a survey.
In the context of quantitative information flow, most works consider only
passive attackers. Boreale and Pampaloni [9] consider adaptive attackers, but
not adaptive defenders, and show that in this case the adversary’s optimal strat-
egy can be always deterministic. Mardziel et al. [22] propose a model for both
adaptive attackers and defenders, but in none of their extensive case-studies the
attacker needs a probabilistic strategy to maximize leakage. In this paper we
characterize when randomization is necessary, for either attacker or defender, to
achieve optimality in our general information leakage games.
Security games have been employed to model and analyze payoffs between
interacting agents, especially between a defender and an attacker. Korzhyk et
al. [20] theoretically analyze security games and study the relationships between
Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria under various forms of imperfect information.
Khouzani and Malacaria [19] study leakage properties when perfect secrecy is
not achievable due to constraints on the allowable size of the conflating sets,
and provide universally optimal strategies for a wide class of entropy measures,
and for g-entropies. These works, contrarily to ours, do not consider games with
hidden choice, in which optimal strategies differ from traditional game-theory.
Several security games have modeled leakage when the sensitive informa-
tion are the defender’s choices themselves, rather than a system’s high input.
For instance, Alon et al. [2] propose zero-sum games in which a defender chooses
probabilities of secrets and an attacker chooses and learns some of the defender’s
secrets. Then they present how the leakage on the defender’s secrets gives in-
fluences on the defender’s optimal strategy. More recently, Xu et al. [30] show
zero-sum games in which the attacker obtains partial knowledge on the security
resources that the defender protects, and provide the defender’s optimal strategy
under the attacker’s such knowledge.
Regarding channel operators, sequential and parallel composition of channels
have been studied (e.g., [18]), but we are unaware of any explicit definition and
investigation of hidden and visible choice operators. Although Kawamoto et
al. [17] implicitly use the hidden choice to model a probabilistic system as the
weighted sum of systems, they do not derive the set of algebraic properties we
do for this operator, and for its interaction with the visible choice operator.
8 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we used protocol composition to model the introduction of noise
performed by the defender to prevent leakage of sensitive information. More
precisely, we formalized visible and hidden probabilistic choices of different pro-
tocols. We then formalized the interplay between defender and adversary in a
game-theoretic framework adapted to the specific issues of QIF, where the payoff
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is information leakage. We considered various kinds of leakage games, depending
on whether players act simultaneously or sequentially, and whether the choices
of the defender are visible or not to the adversary. We established a hierarchy
of these games, and provided methods for finding the optimal strategies (at the
points of equilibrium) in the various cases.
As future research, we would like to extend leakage games to the case of
repeated observations, i.e., when the attacker can observe the outcomes of the
system in successive runs, under the assumption that both attacker and defender
may change the channel in each run. We would also like to extend our frame-
work to non zero-sum games, in which the costs of attack and defense are not
equivalent, and to analyze differentially-private mechanisms.
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A Proofs of Technical Results
In this section we provide proofs for our technical results.
A.1 Preliminaries for proofs
We start by providing some necessary background for the subsequent technical
proofs.
Definition 4 states that two compatible channels (i.e., with the same input
space) are equivalent if yield the same value of vulnerability for every prior
and every vulnerability function. The result below, from the literature, provides
necessary and sufficient conditions for two channels being equivalent. The result
employs the extension of channels with an all-zero column as follows. For any
channel C of type X × Y → R, its zero-column extension C
0
is the channel of
type X × (Y ∪ {y0}) → R, with y0 ∉ Y, s.t. C0(x, y) = C(x, y) for all x ∈ X ,
y ∈ Y, and C
0(x, y0) = 0 for all x ∈ X .
Lemma 17 (Characterization of channel equivalence [7,24]) Two chan-
nels C1 and C2 are equivalent iff every column of C1 is a convex combination of
columns of C
0
2 , and every column of C2 is a convex combination of columns of
C
0
1 .
Note that the result above implies that for being equivalent, any two channels
must be compatible.
A.2 Proofs of Section 4
Proposition 2 Given a family {Ci}i∈I of channels of type X × Y → R, and a
distribution µ on I, the hidden choice ⨊i←µCi is a channel of type X ×Y → R.
Proof. Since hidden choice is defined as a summation of matrices, the type of
⨊i←µCi is the same as the type of every Ci in the family.
To see that ⨊i←µCi is a channel (i.e., all of its entries are non-negative, and
all of its rows sum up to 1), first note that, since each Ci in the family is a
channel matrix, Ci(x, y) lies in the interval [0, 1] for all x ∈ X , y ∈ Y. Since µ
is a set of convex coefficients, from the definition of hidden choice it follows that
also ∑i∈I µ(i)Ci(x, y) must lie in the interval [0, 1] for every x, y.
Second, note that for all x ∈ X :
∑
y∈Y
(⨊
i←µ
Ci) (x, y) = ∑
y∈Y
∑
i∈I
µ(i)Ci(x, y) (def. of hidden choice)
= ∑
i∈I
µ(i)∑
y∈Y
Ci(x, y)
= ∑
i∈I
µ(i) ⋅ 1 (Ci∶X×Y→R are channels)
= 1 (µ is a prob. dist.)
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Proposition 3 Given a family {Ci}i∈I of compatible channels s.t. each Ci has
type X × Yi → R, and a distribution µ on I, the result of the visible choice
&i←µCi is a channel of type X × (⨆i∈I Yi) → R.
Proof. Visible choice applied to a family {Ci} of channels scales each matrix
Ci by a factor µ(i), which preserves the type X × Yi → R of each matrix,
and then concatenates all the matrices so produced, yielding a result of type
X × (⨆i∈I Yi) → R.
To see that &i←µCi is a channel (i.e., that all of its entries are non-negative,
and that all rows sum-up to 1), note that each element of the visible choice on
the family {Ci} can be denoted by (&i←µCi) (x, (y, j)), where x ∈ X , j ∈ I,
and y ∈ Yj . Then, note that for all x ∈ X , j ∈ I, and y ∈ Yj :
(&
i←µ
Ci) (x, (y, j)) = (◇i∈Iµ(i)Ci) (x, (y, j)) (def. of visible choice)
= (µ(j)Cj) (x, y) (def. of concatenation)
=µ(j)Cj(x, y) (def. of scalar mult.) (1)
which is a non-negative value, since, both µ(j) and Cj(x, y) are non-negative.
Finally, note that for all x ∈ X :
∑
j∈I
y∈Yj
(&
i←µ
Ci) (x, (y, j)) = ∑
j∈I
y∈Yj
µ(j)Cj(x, y) (by Eq. (1))
= ∑
j∈I
µ(j) ∑
y∈Yj
Cj(x, y)
= ∑
j∈I
µ(j) ⋅ 1 (Cj ∶X×Yj→R are channels)
= 1 (µ is a prob. dist.)
Proposition 5 (Idempotency) Given a family {Ci}i∈I of channels s.t. Ci =
C for all i ∈ I, and a distribution µ on I, then: (a) ⨊i←µCi = C; and (b)
&i←µCi ≈ C.
Proof. a) Idempotency of hidden choice:
⨊
i←µ
Ci =∑
i
µ(i)Ci (def. of hidden choice)
=∑
i
µ(i)C (since every Ci = C)
=C∑
i
µ(i)
=C (since µ is a prob. dist.)
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b) Idempotency of visible choice:
&
i←µ
Ci = ◇i µ(i)Ci (def. of visible choice)
= ◇i µ(i)C (since every Ci = C)
≈C (by Lemma 17)
In the above derivation, we can apply Lemma 17 because every column of
the channel on each side of the equivalence can be written as a convex com-
bination of the zero-column extension of the channel on the other side.
Proposition 6 (“Reorganization of operators”) Given a family {Cij}i∈I,j∈J
of channels indexed by sets I and J , a distribution µ on I, and a distribution
η on J :
(a) ⨊i←µ ⨊j←ηCij = ⨊i←µ
j←η
Cij , if all Ci’s have the same type;
(b) &i←µ &j←ηCij ≈ &i←µ
j←η
Cij , if all Ci’s are compatible; and
(c) ⨊i←µ &j←ηCij ≈ &j←η ⨊i←µCij , if, for each i, all Cij’s have same type
X×Yj→R.
Proof. a)
⨊
i←µ
⨊
j←η
Cij =⨊
i←µ
(∑
j
η(j)Cij) (def. of hidden choice)
=∑
i
µ(i) (∑
j
η(j)Cij) (def. of hidden choice)
=∑
i,j
η(i)η(j)Cij (reorganizing the sums)
=⨊
i←µ
j←η
Cij (def. of hidden choice)
b)
&
i←µ
&
j←η
Cij =&
i←µ
(◇jCij) (def. of visible choice)
= ◇i µ(i) (◇jη(j)Cij) (def. of visible choice)
≈◇ij µ(i)η(j)Cij (by Lemma 17)
=&
i←µ
j←η
Cij (def. of visible choice)
In the above derivation, we can apply Lemma 17 because every column of
the channel on each side of the equivalence can be written as a convex com-
bination of the zero-column extension of the channel on the other side.
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c)
⨊
i←µ
&
j←η
Cij =⨊
i←µ
(◇jCij) (def. of visible choice)
=∑
i
µ(i) (◇jη(j)Cij) (def. of hidden choice)
≈ ◇j η(j) (∑
i
η(i)Cij) (by Lemma 17)
=&
j←η
⨊
i←µ
Cij (def. of operators)
In the above derivation, we can apply Lemma 17 because every column of
the channel on each side of the equivalence can be written as a convex com-
bination of the zero-column extension of the channel on the other side.
Theorem 7 Let {Ci}i∈I be a family of channels, and µ be a distribution on I.
Then, for every distribution pi on X , and every vulnerability V:
(a) posterior vulnerability is convex w.r.t. to hidden choice: V [pi,⨊i←µCi] ≤
∑i∈I µ(i)V [pi,Ci] if all Ci’s have the same type.
(b) posterior vulnerability is linear w.r.t. to visible choice: V [pi,&i←µCi] =
∑i∈I µ(i)V [pi,Ci] if all Ci’s are compatible.
Proof. a) Let us call X ×Y → R the type of each channel Ci in the family {Ci}.
Then:
V [pi,⨊
i←µ
Ci] =V [pi,∑
i
µ(i)Ci] (def. of hidden choice)
= ∑
y∈Y
p(y) ⋅ V [pi(⋅)∑i µ(i)Ci(⋅, y)
p(y) ] (def. of posterior V)
= ∑
y∈Y
p(y) ⋅ V [∑
i
µ(i)pi(⋅)Ci(⋅, y)
p(y) ]
≤ ∑
y∈Y
p(y) ⋅∑
i
µ(i)V [pi(⋅)Ci(⋅, y)
p(y) ] (by convexity of V)
=∑
i
µ(i)∑
y∈Y
p(y)V [pi(⋅)Ci(⋅, y)
p(y) ]
=∑
i
µ(i)V [pi,Ci]
where p(y) = ∑x∈X pi(x)∑i µ(i)Ci(x, y).
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b) Let us call X ×Yi → R the type of each channel Ci in the family {Ci}. Then:
V [pi,&
i←µ
Ci] =V [pi,◇iµ(i)Ci] (def. of visible choice)
= ∑
y∈Y
p(y) ⋅ V [pi(⋅)◇i µ(i)Ci(⋅, y)
p(y) ] (def. of posterior V)
= ∑
y∈Y
p(y) ⋅ V [◇iµ(i)pi(⋅)Ci(⋅, y)
p(y) ]
= ∑
y∈Y
p(y) ⋅∑
i
µ(i)V [pi(⋅)Ci(⋅, y)
p(y) ] (see (*) below)
=∑
i
µ(i)∑
y∈Y
p(y)V [pi(⋅)Ci(⋅, y)
p(y) ]
=∑
i
µ(i)V [pi,Ci]
where p(y) = ∑x∈X pi(x)∑i µ(i)Ci(x, y), and step (*) holds because in the
vulnerability of a concatenation of matrices every column will contribute to
the vulnerability in proportion to its weight in the concatenation, and hence it
is possible to break the vulnerability of a concatenated matrix as the weighted
sum of the vulnerabilities of its sub-matrices.
Corollary 8 Let {Cij}i∈I,j∈J be a family of channels, all with domain X and
with the same type, and let pi ∈ DX , and V be any vulnerability. Define U ∶
DI × DJ → R as follows: U (µ, η) def= V [pi,⨊i←µ &j←η Cij]. Then U is convex
on µ and linear on η.
Proof. To see that U(µ, η) is convex on µ, note that:
U(µ, η) =V [pi,⨊
i←µ
&
j←η
Cij] (by definition)
≤∑
i
µ(i) V [pi,&
j←η
Cij] (by Theorem 7)
To see that U(µ, η) is linear on η, note that:
U(µ, η) =V [pi,⨊
i←µ
&
j←η
Cij] (by definition)
=V [pi,&
j←η
⨊
i←µ
Cij] (by Prop. 6)
=∑
j
η(j) V [pi,⨊
i←µ
Cij] (by Theorem. 7)
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B Properties of binary versions of channel operators
In this section we derive some relevant properties of the binary versions of the
hidden and visible choice operators. We start with results regarding each oper-
ator individually.
Proposition 18 (Properties of the binary hidden choice) For any chan-
nels C1 and C2 of the same type, and any values 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1, the binary hidden
choice operator satisfies the following properties:
a) Idempotency: C1 p⊕ C1 = C1
b) Commutativity: C1 p⊕ C2 = C2 p¯⊕ C1
c) Associativity:
C1 p⊕ (C2 q⊕ C3) = (1/q ⋅ C1 p⊕ C2) q⊕ p¯ ⋅ C3
if q ≠ 0.
d) Absorption:
(C1 p⊕ C2) q⊕ (C1 r⊕ C2) = C1 (pq+q¯r)⊕ C2.
Proof. We will prove each property separately.
a) Idempotency:
C1 p⊕ C1 = p ⋅ C1 + p¯ ⋅ C1 (def. of hidden choice)
= (p + p¯) ⋅ C1
=C1 (p + p¯ = 1)
b) Commutativity:
C1 p⊕ C2 = p ⋅ C1 + p¯ ⋅ C2 (def. of hidden choice)
= p¯ ⋅ C2 + p ⋅ C1
=C2 p¯⊕ C1 (def. of hidden choice)
c) Associativity:
C1 p⊕ (C2 q⊕ C3)
= p ⋅C1 + p¯(q ⋅ C2 + q¯ ⋅ C3) (def. of hidden choice)
= p ⋅C1 + p¯q ⋅ C2 + p¯q¯ ⋅ C3
= q(p(1/q ⋅ C1) + p¯ ⋅ C2) + q¯(p¯ ⋅ C3)
= (1/q ⋅C1 p⊕ C2) q⊕ p¯ ⋅ C3 (def. of hidden choice)
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d) Absorption: First note that:
(C1 p⊕ C2) q⊕ (C1 r⊕ C2)
= q(pC1 + p¯C2) + q¯(rC1 + r¯C2) (def. of hidden choice)
= pqC1 + p¯qC2 + q¯rC1 + q¯r¯C2
= (pq + q¯r)C1 + (p¯q + q¯r¯)C2
=C1 (pq+q¯r)⊕ C2 (*)
To complete the proof, note that in step (*) above, pq + q¯r and p¯q + q¯r¯ form
a valid binary probability distribution (they are both non-negative, and they
add up to 1), then apply the definition of hidden choice.
Proposition 19 (Properties of binary visible choice) For any compatible
channels C1 and C2, and any values 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1, the visible choice operator
satisfies the following properties:
a) Idempotency: C1 pH C1 ≈ C1
b) Commutativity: C1 pH C2 ≈ C2 p¯H C1
c) Associativity: C1 pH (C2 qH C3) ≈ (1/q ⋅ C1 pH C2) qH p¯ ⋅ C3 if q ≠ 0.
Proof. We will prove each property separately.
a) Idempotency: C1 pH C1 ≈ C1, by immediate application of Lemma 17, since
every column of the channel on each side of the equivalence can be written
as a convex combination of the zero-column extension of the channel on the
other side.
b) Commutativity:
C1 pH C2 = p ⋅ C1 ⋄ p¯ ⋅ C2 (def. of visible choice)
≈ p¯ ⋅C2 ⋄ p ⋅ C1 (by Lemma 17)
= C2 p¯H C1 (def. of visible choice).
In the above derivation, we can apply Lemma 17 because every column of
the channel on each side of the equivalence can be written as a convex com-
bination of the zero-column extension of the channel on the other side.
c) Associativity:
C1 pH (C2 qH C3) = p ⋅ C1 ⋄ p¯(q ⋅C2 ⋄ q¯ ⋅ C3) (def. of visible choice)
≈ p ⋅ C1 ⋄ (p¯q ⋅C2 ⋄ p¯q¯ ⋅ C3) (by Lemma 17)
= q(p(1/q ⋅ C1) ⋄ p¯ ⋅ C2) ⋄ q¯(p¯ ⋅ C3)
= (1/q ⋅ C1 pH C2) qH p¯ ⋅ C3 (def. of visible choice)
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In the above derivation, we can apply Lemma 17 because every column of
the channel on each side of the equivalence can be written as a convex com-
bination of the zero-column extension of the channel on the other side.
Now we turn our attention to the interaction between hidden and visible
choice operators.
A first result is that hidden choice does not distribute over visible choice. To
see why, note that C1 p⊕ (C2 qH C3) and (C1 p⊕ C2) qH (C1 p⊕ C3) cannot
be both defined: if the former is defined, then C1 must have the same type as
C2 qH C3, whereas if the latter is defined, C1 must have the same type as C2,
but C2 qH C3 and C2 do not have the same type (they have different output
sets).
However, as the next result shows, visible choice distributes over hidden
choice.
Proposition 20 (Distributivity of pH over q⊕ ) Let C1, C2 and C3 be
compatible channels, and C2 and C3 have the same type. Then, for any values
0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1:
C1 pH (C2 q⊕ C3) ≈ (C1 pH C2) q⊕ (C1 pH C3).
Proof.
C1 pH (C2 q⊕ C3)
= (C1 q⊕ C1) pH (C2 q⊕ C3) (idempotency of visible choice)
= p(q ⋅ C1 + q¯ ⋅ C1) ⋄ p¯(q ⋅ C2 + q¯ ⋅ C3) (def. of operators)
= (pq ⋅ C1 + pq¯ ⋅ C1) ⋄ (p¯q ⋅ C2 + p¯q¯ ⋅ C3)
≈ (pq ⋅ C1 ⋄ p¯q ⋅ C2) + (pq¯ ⋅ C1 ⋄ p¯q¯ ⋅ C3) (by Lemma 17)
= q(p ⋅ C1 ⋄ p¯ ⋅ C2) + q¯(p ⋅ C1 ⋄ p¯ ⋅ C3)
= q(C1 pH C2) + q¯(C1 pH C3) (def. of visible choice)
= (C1 pH C2) q⊕ (C1 pH C3) (def. of hidden choice)
In the above derivation, we can apply Lemma 17 because every column of the
channel on each side of the equivalence can be written as a convex combination
of the zero-column extension of the channel on the other side.
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